ABSTRACT. This note, suitable for a lecture in an advanced undergraduate or basic graduate course on the economic theory of networks, exposits basic ideas of linear best-response games and their equilibria.
BASIC SETUP AND RESULTS
We study the game of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) , who introduced the idea of the connection between Nash equilibria of a certain kind of game and centrality measures that we will derive is due to them.
Consider a complete-information game where each player (also called agent) i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . ., n} simultaneously selects a real-valued action a i ≥ 0 and receives a real-valued payoff u i (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) that depends on everyone's action. Suppose that each agent i 's best-response function is given by 
Existence result. Recall that r (A) is the spectral radius of a matrix
A, which has two equivalent definitions: (i) the maximum absolute value of any eigenvalue; and (b) the definition you studied in Problem Set 1, Problem 4.
Date: May 2018. 1 We call a matrix irreducible if the corresponding weighted, directed graph is strongly connected. A 1-by-1 nonnegative matrix is said to be irreducible if its sole entry is positive. Theorem 1. If r (αW ) < 1 then there is exactly one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game described above, given by a * = (I − αW )
The result can be established by manipulating the assumed best responses of each agent to show that as long as (I −αW )
It is left as an exercise to show that (I − αW )
exists, has the claimed Neumann series expansion, and is nonnegative. . . , i (ℓ + 1)) define its weight to be the product of the weights of the edges constituting that walk:
Let W ℓ (W ; i , j ) be the set of all walks of length ℓ from i to j . 
The "default" value of b is 1, the vector of all ones.
We are using hats to distinguish these from the parameters of our game, since the arguments of β can be anything (though of course we will apply it to the game shortly). Note that the Bonacich centrality satisfies
The idea behind this equation is that β i is a measure of i 's network centrality. It is the sum of a "base" level b i and a socially derived part α j W i j β j , where W i j describes the part of β j that accrues to i . The natural interpretation in many cases is that W i j is the amount of attention that i gets from j , so is naturally interpreted as a link from j to i .
The reference for this notion is Bonacich (1987) . However, Leontief studied very similar "centrality" measures around 30 years before that, and the Leontief inverse, (I − αW )
, comes up in the current study of production networks (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Baqaee and Farhi, 2017) . Now, we know from the Neumann series that
Thus we can interpret an agent's Bonacich centrality in terms of sums of walk weights. You did a similar thing for unweighted walks in Problem Set 1.
In our applications, we will be interested in the Bonacich centrality vector, β( W ; α, b), for various matrices W and various vectors b. For example, clearly in our game as set up in the beginning of Section 1.1 we may write the unique equilibrium identified in Theorem 1 as
We can also describe another important aspect of our game via a different application of Bonacich centrality, i.e., with different parameters. Define the total activity level by A * = i a * i and define the keyness of i to be It is a good exercise to show that the keyness vector can be expressed in terms of Bonacich centrality. That, figure out how to fill in the question marks in: , so that r (αW ) ↑ 1. What happens?
Well, let's stare at the sum
We know that for each α it is well-defined and finite. But what happens to a typical entry in the limit?
As we saw in Problem Set 1, Problem 3, the maximum entry of However, now that b depends on α, the asymptotics of this model in α will be different from the case in which b does not depend on α from the previous subsection.
With the parameter values described above, the game we have been studying is a coordination game: every player wants to match a weighted 3 This is only one way of measuring what players are key, and in order for this to be a guide to interventions, various assumptions about costs and benefits of intervention have to hold. See Galeotti, Golub, and Goyal (2017) for more on this, and other network measures that might show up when we model the intervention differently. 4 A matrix is said to be row-stochastic if each of its rows adds up to 1. average of (i) own ideal action y i and (ii) a weighted average of neighbors' actions. You should check that in i 's best-response function
the weights placed on y i and the various a j 's sum to 1. Applying Theorem 1 to characterize the equilibrium, we find:
You'll show in Problem Set 2 that every player's action ends up being an average of ideal points y i with certain weights.
Since it turns out that r (Γ) = 1 (the spectral radius of a row-stochastic matrix is equal to 1) the characterization of Theorem 1 holds for all α < 1.
Note that at α = 1 corresponds to a pure coordination game, and you should convince yourself that the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are exactly the action profiles with everyone taking the same action. In particular, in the α = 1 game there is a huge amount of equilibrium multiplicity.
For any α < 1, however, the game has a unique equilibrium. Also in Problem Set 2, you'll verify that the equilibria as α ↑ 1 converge to a welldefined limit in which all players take the same action, no matter what that action is. Thus, we can think of the α ↑ 1 limit as a way to refine the large set of equilibria in the α = 1 coordination game.
In the α ↑ 1 limit, long walks (in Γ) also matter: this follows from (3). But now they matter in a limit that is better-behaved than the explosive limit studied in the previous subsection. Here the long walks will determine the way in which everyone averages the ideal points y i in setting their actions.
THE PERRON-FROBENIUS THEOREM
4.1. Motivation. As just discussed, we are interested in the α ↑ r (W ) −1 limit of our game, which will correspond to the type of Bonacich centrality that
• cares as much about network effects as possible subject to being well-defined • cares a lot about long walks.
The next result, which is a fundamental theorem that will recur repeatedly, will help us think about this limit. Indeed, it will tell us essentially everything about W ℓ for large ℓ. But getting there takes a little bit of setup.
4.2. Perron-Frobenius Theorem. This theorem goes a long way in the economic analysis of networks.
5
A wonderful reference on it is Carl D. Meyer's Matrix Analysis and Applied Linear Algebra, Chapter 8; I recommend this textbook very highly. A shorter self-contained exposition can be found in Debreu and Herstein's 1953 paper in Econometrica (1953) .
For any matrix A, we denote by spec(A) the set of its eigenvalues. This set is also called its spectrum.
Definition. The spectral radius of A is defined to be
which is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues of A. 5 See Elliott and Golub (2018) for a use of it in the context of characterizing efficient, rather than Nash equilibrium, outcomes. 6 The notation R n + means the set of all vectors in R n with nonnegative entries. 7 The fact that r (A ⊺ ) = r (A) is also easily deduced from the solution to Problem Set 1, Problem 4, as long as we accept that the definitions of r (A) given there and in the present note are equivalent.
You have already met r (A) from another angle, in Problem 4 of Problem Set 1, though this is the first time we are discussing the Perron eigenvectors. 
The right-hand side is a rank-1 matrix whose (i , j ) entry is cp i q j , where the normalizing constant is the dot product of p and q. This is proved in (Meyer, 2000) .
COMMENTS AND RELATED MODELS
For our purposes, this resolves the question of how influential various individuals are on the group outcome. The results we just derived about the behavior of long walks are important when we study the long-run behavior of naive learning processes. In particular, the weight of long walks determines one's influence (Golub and Jackson, 2010) . The rate at which the approximations above become good is studied in (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2012) .
A very natural question is how to extend the analysis we have done to incomplete information. This is done in de Martí and Zenou (2015) Golub and Morris (2017a) , and Lambert, Martini, and Ostrovsky (2018) . Golub and Morris (2017b) shows that the linear algebra we have discussed above is closely related to higher-order expectations, an important object in the study of beliefs and priors generally.
